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The Referendum and After: Scotland’s Constitutional Future 
Tom MULLEN* 
1 INTRODUCTION 
On 18 September 2104, the people of Scotland voted by 55% to 45% to remain in the United 
Kingdom, but this did not settle the question of Scotland’s Constitutional Future or indeed 
that of the UK as a whole. Previous rapports have considered developments in the 
governance of Scotland up to 2011.1 This rapport tries to bring the story up to date (i.e., the 
end of November 2015). 
The lead up to the referendum began with the elections of May 2007 for the Scottish 
Parliament. The Scottish National Party (SNP) was the largest party and formed a minority 
government. In August 2007, the SNP government started a ‘national conversation’ on 
Scotland’s constitutional future.2 In response, the opposition parties appointed the 
Commission on Scottish Devolution (the ‘Calman Commission’) in March 2008 to consider 
revision of the devolution settlement on the assumption that Scotland would remain in the 
UK. The final report of the Calman Commission made a number of proposals for revising the 
devolution settlement.3 These proposals were accepted by the UK government (then Labour), 
which promised to introduce a Bill to implement the Commissions’ recommendations after 
the 2010 UK elections. That produced a change of government, but the Conservative Liberal 
Democrat coalition renewed the commitment to further devolution and enacted the Scotland 
Act 2012. However, the most important changes – a new power to raise or lower income tax 
by up to 10 pence in the pound coupled with a reduction in the block grant to the Scottish 
Government4 – was not due to come into effect until April 2016. 
In the meantime, the SNP, to the surprise of many, had won an absolute majority (69 out of 
129 seats) at the Scottish Parliament election of 2011, able to form a single party majority 
government, the first since devolution, and a surprising development in view of the elections 
being conducted under the additional member system of proportional representation. The 
                                                          
* University of Glasgow. 
1 The most recent rapport was T. Mullen, ‘Devolution in Scotland: Increasing Autonomy?’ 17 Eur. Pub. L. 399–
414 (2011). 
2 Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation: Independence and responsibility in the modern world 
Scottish Government (2007) available at: http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2007/08/13103747/0. 
3 Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st Century (2009), available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_06_09_calman.pdf. 
4 This term refers to the annual Treasury grant, which supports devolved public spending in Scotland. 
SNP’s election manifesto had included a pledge to hold a referendum on independence, and it 
announced that it would proceed to do so. The Scottish and UK Governments reached an 
agreement on the terms on which a referendum would be held expressed in the Edinburgh 
Agreement of 15 October 2012.5 The referendum took place on 18 September 2014, but 
although the vote went against independence, it was already apparent that there would be 
significant change in the governance of Scotland. 
A few days before the referendum, there was an important intervention in the campaign. 
The leaders of the three largest pro-union parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal 
Democrat) made a vow together to the Scottish electorate that if the Scots were to vote to 
remain in the union, there would be devolution of ‘extensive new powers’ to the Scottish 
Parliament. The vow appeared on the front page of the Daily Record (the newspaper with the 
highest circulation in Scotland).6 The Prime Minister appointed Lord Smith of Kelvin, a 
member of the House of Lords to oversee the process of taking forward the promise of further 
devolution, with powers over tax, spending and welfare all to be agreed by November 2014 
and draft legislation to be published by January 2015.7 Lord Smith chaired a commission, 
which held cross party talks (the Commission included two representatives each of the five 
political parties represented in the Scottish Parliament and a process of civic engagement). 
This resulted in a report agreed to by all the party representatives, which was published on 27 
November 2014.8 The UK government published its response to the Smith Commission’s 
report, which included draft Bill clauses on 25 January 2015,9 and the Scotland Bill 2015–
2016 was introduced in the House of Commons on 28 May 2015. 
Despite having lost the referendum, the position of the SNP was strengthened by the UK 
General election on 7 May 2015. The SNP took 50% of the vote (up from 19.9% at the 2010 
election) and won 56 of the 59 Scottish constituencies in the UK Parliament.10 This result 
was truly astonishing; no party had ever won such a high proportion of Scottish seats. The 
main losers were the Labour party (whose share of the vote declined from 42% at the 2010 
election to 24.3%) and the Liberal Democrat party (whose share of the vote declined from 
18.9% at the 2010 election to 7.5%). The decline in the Conservative vote was not nearly as 
                                                          
5 Available at: http://www.gov.scot/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence. 
6 http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron-ed-miliband-nick-4265992. 
7 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/scottish-independence-referendum-statement-by-the-prime-minister. 
8 Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament, available at: 
https://www.smith-commission.scot/smith-commission-report/. 
9 Scotland in the United Kingdom: An enduring settlement, Cm 8990, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/397079/Scotland_EnduringSettle
ment_acc.pdf. 
10 The Labour, Liberal and Conservative parties won one seat each. 
dramatic, but at 14.9% it was the lowest proportion of the Scottish vote they had ever 
achieved at a general election. 
The scale of change in Scottish Politics has, therefore been dramatic and the pace rapid. In 
these circumstances, the task of predicting future developments is even more difficult than 
usual. Other political developments add to the uncertainty. One of the outcomes of the 
referendum campaign has been a greater awareness of the territorial dimension of UK 
politics. Citizens in England are much more aware of, and concerned about, the potential 
impact on them of whatever arrangements are made for devolution to Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales. Citizens in Wales and Northern Ireland have become more aware of, and 
concerned about, the implications for them of devolution to Scotland. As a result, what is on 
the agenda is not only change to the arrangements for devolved government in Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and Wales, but also changes to the institutions of central government to 
reflect better the major change in government that devolution amounts to. Finally, there is the 
question of Europe. The UK Government has promised a referendum on whether the UK 
should remain in the European Union and has also promised to introduce a UK Bill of Rights 
to reduce the influence of the Strasbourg Court in the UK. Both developments are opposed by 
the SNP which has argued that if the UK as whole votes to leave the EU, that would justify a 
second referendum on independence. 
That is a brief summary of events. In the rest of this rapport, I will consider two issues 
about the referendum and its aftermath: the analysis of the vote and the current proposals for 
further devolution. 
2 ANALYSIS OF THE VOTE11 
The referendum had a very high turnout, with 84.6% of the electorate voting, a higher 
proportion than at any UK General election since … and much higher than at the 2010 
general election. A total of 44.7% voted for independence and 55.3% to remain in the UK. It 
is instructive to examine the patterns of voting; the propensity to vote for or against 
independence varied according the personal characteristics of voters (socio-economic status, 
age, gender, place of birth and party affiliation) and geography. 
The general tendency was for persons who were more affluent or in higher status groups to 
be less likely to vote for independence than those less advantaged. There was a small 
difference between men and women with men more likely to vote for independence. A higher 
                                                          
11 See also T. Mullen, ‘The Scottish Independence Referendum’, J. L. & Socy. 41(4), 627–640 (2014). 
proportion of older than younger voters voted against independence. Those born in Scotland 
were more likely to vote yes than those born outside Scotland, and the group least likely to 
vote for independence were those born elsewhere in the UK. 
Party affiliation can be assessed by reference to how people voted in the 2011 elections to 
the Scottish Parliament. On that measure, around 80% of SNP supporters voted for 
independence, 43% of Liberal Democrat voters, 31% of Labour voters and 2% of 
Conservative voters. Whilst the relative enthusiasm for independence corresponds roughly 
with the long-term policy stances, it is noteworthy that a substantial minority of SNP 
supporters did not vote for independence, and a larger minority of Labour supporters voted 
for independence even though the Labour party had campaigned in favour of the union. 
As for geography, in only four of Scotland’s thirty-two local authority areas was there a 
majority for independence. These were the cities of Dundee and Glasgow, West 
Dunbartonshire and North Lanarkshire. In a fifth area, Inverclyde, the vote was almost evenly 
split with 49.9% voting for independence. These areas are all located in the central belt and 
have relatively high levels of poverty and deprivation compared to the rest of the country. 
The correlation between relative deprivation and voting for independence was even more 
marked in polling data based on smaller units of analysis which suggested that in the 20% of 
the most deprived areas in Scotland, around 60% voted for independence. This apparent 
correlation between affluence and voting decisions was also apparent in surveys of individual 
voters. 
The local authority areas which voted most strongly against independence were those 
nearest England (Scottish Borders, Dumfries and Galloway) and those furthest from the 
central belt (the Orkney and Shetland Islands). 
Analysing all the data, it appears that the most pronounced differences between voters 
were those of age and relative affluence, and this helps to explain the geographical pattern 
with the most deprived areas being the most pro-independence. But knowing what the 
characteristics of voters were does not tell us why they voted as they did. 
Although the margin of victory was clear, it was for supporters of the union too narrow for 
comfort, there remains a very real possibility that the UK will break-up in the foreseeable 
future, a possibility confirmed by the SNP’s success at the 2015 general election. In that 
context, both the substance of the proposals for devolution and the process through which 
they are being developed may be crucial to the survival of the UK as a single state. 
For the UK government and for the UK political parties, the objective of the reform 
process is to stabilize the union. Scotland is to be given more autonomy within the union to 
persuade it to stay in the union. Of course, the SNP and many Scots do not share the aim. 
Whether the aim succeeds will depend on many factors, but one important factor is that a key 
participant in the reform process – the SNP/Scottish Government – does not support the 
ultimate aim. For it, further devolution is a stepping stone to independence. This rapport 
attempts to explain and analyse the reform proposals and the reform process, and to consider 
some of the implications for the future of Scotland and the UK. 
3 PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER DEVOLUTION: THE 
PROCESS 
If the ultimate objective of reform is to stabilize the union, there are two major concerns 
about the current process; that it is too fast and that it is insufficiently comprehensive.12 The 
Smith Commission completed its work in a little over two months. The UK Government 
produced its detailed proposals for the Scotland Bill only two months after that, and the Bill 
was introduced in the House of Commons after a further three months. Whilst there is clearly 
pressure arising from public expectation to deliver further devolution swiftly, given the 
importance and the complexity of the changes, such a rapid process creates the risk that the 
implications of the changes proposed may not be fully understood or the possible effects 
appreciated. 
The other concern is that constitutional reform is not being pursued in a holistic manner. 
There is a clear need to rethink the UK constitution as whole, or at least its territorial 
dimension. The UK’s constitution and governance structure have always been asymmetrical. 
There is nothing wrong with asymmetry per se. Asymmetrical government was a 
consequence of the UK’s history circumstances and it made sense in its context. But whilst 
neither logic nor rationality requires the governing institutions of a state to be organized 
symmetrically, there are limits to the extent and forms of asymmetry which are workable, and 
if asymmetry comes to be perceived as inappropriate by the population, then that perception 
needs to be addressed in some way. The devolved schemes of government introduced in 1999 
added greatly to that asymmetry of the UK’s governance arrangements. The schemes of 
devolved government for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were different one from 
another, and there was no devolution for England; the UK Parliament doubled up as an 
English Parliament. Since 1999, increasing notice has been taken of the asymmetry by the 
                                                          
12 See, e.g. R. Hazell (ed.), Devolution and the Future of the Union, The Constitution Unit (April 2015), 
available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/publications/tabs/unit-publications/163.pdf/. 
population at large, particularly in England and political parties, and it has been apparent for 
several years that the continuing popular assent to that asymmetry in all parts of the UK can 
no longer be assumed. The fact of devolution in Scotland and its consequences (real or 
imagined) have become of increasing concern to citizens in the rest of the UK. 
The offer of further decentralization to Scotland clearly makes more pressing the questions 
of what powers devolved government in Wales and Northern Ireland ought to have and of 
whether and in what form there should be decentralization of power in England. The other 
pressing question is what should be done about central government. It is not an exaggeration 
to say that central government in the UK has carried on largely as if devolution had not 
happened. There have been no substantial changes in the way that the UK Parliament or UK 
departments operate to accommodate the changes to the governance of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. There have certainly been some changes in institutions and processes but 
for the most part these have not been reactions to devolution. 
The question of what additional powers should be given to Scotland is plainly linked to the 
questions of what should be the nature and degree of decentralization in all parts of the UK 
and how the central state institutions should be structured. Up till now, these have been kept 
separate. Each time since 1999 that a significant modification to one of the devolution 
schemes has been made that has been a matter for negotiation between the UK Government 
and that territory and debates about reform of Parliament or central government have often 
failed to take account of the implications of devolution. In the aftermath of the referendum, a 
clear link was made. In his speech the day after the referendum, the Prime Minister said that 
‘a new and fair settlement for Scotland should be accompanied by a new and fair settlement 
that applies to all parts of our United Kingdom’ and the question of English votes for English 
laws – the so-called West Lothian question – required a decisive answer. Moreover, ‘all this 
must take place in tandem with, and at the same pace as, the settlement for Scotland’. The 
suggestion that all constitutional changes had to proceed at the same pace was later retracted. 
Nonetheless, the House of Commons voted on 22 October 2015 to adopt new standing orders 
whereby only English MPs would decide whether to enact legislation that would apply to 
England only. So, although the link between different aspects of the territorial aspect of UK 
government has been made by the PM, there is little evidence so far that the necessary 
‘joined-up thinking’ is being done within the UK Government. The proposals are proceeding 
along separate tracks with no process which attempts to provide an overview. The result may 
be that major changes are made to the UK constitution, which do not prove to be a workable 
and durable response to the problem of how to accommodate national diversity whilst still 
maintaining a stable union. This risk is increased by the fact that the current UK government 
is not attempting to proceed by consensus even amongst those parties which support the 
union. If the current processes produce new arrangements which are broadly perceived as 
unfair to one or more of the constituent nations of the UK, or as an attempt to gain partisan 
advantage for one party or are simply unworkable in practice, that will make the break-up of 
the UK more rather than less likely. 
4 PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER DEVOLUTION: THE 
SUBSTANCE 
In this section of the rapport, I consider the substantive powers that will be devolved. The 
report of the Smith Commission grouped the recommendations for further devolution agreed 
by the political parties into three main areas (referred to in the report as ‘pillars’): these being 
constitutional structure, additional functions and financing devolved government. 
The main proposals were as follows: 
 
Constitutional structure 
 
– UK legislation should state that the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government are 
permanent institutions; 
– The Sewel Convention should be put on a statutory footing; 
– The Scottish Parliament should have all powers in relation to elections to the Scottish 
Parliament (subject to the need for two-thirds majority to pass legislation affecting the franchise, the 
electoral system or the number of members for the Scottish Parliament); 
– The SP should power to make decisions about all matters relating to the arrangements and 
operations of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government; 
– Revised arrangements for inter-governmental relations (i.e., amongst the UK government and 
the devolved governments). 
 
Additional functions 
 
The Scottish Parliament should have devolved to it: 
– powers over selected social security benefits (including housing benefit,13 and benefits for 
carers, disabled people and those who are ill); 
– power to create new social security benefits, provided they are within devolved responsibility 
(e.g., new housing-related benefits) and to top-up benefits which remain reserved to the UK 
government (e.g., jobseekers allowance); 
– abortion; 
– powers over the management and operation of all reserved tribunals (e.g., employment and social 
security tribunals) but not the substantive law applied by these tribunals; 
– limited additional transport powers; 
– licensing of onshore oil and gas extraction (but not offshore). 
                                                          
13 Strictly speaking, the proposal is to devolve the housing support element of universal credit, a new means 
tested benefit which will replace several current means tested benefits including housing benefit. 
 
Financing devolved government 
 
– Income tax would become a shared tax. The Scottish Parliament should have power to set the 
rates of income tax and the thresholds at which it is these are paid for the income of Scottish taxpayers 
(other than income from savings and dividends). All other aspects of Income Tax will remain reserved 
to the UK Parliament (e.g., the personal allowance and tax reliefs); 
– the Barnett formula would continue to be used to calculate the amount of the annual block 
grant from the UK Treasury to support Scottish Public expenditure but the amount will be reduced to 
reflect the additional powers devolved over income tax; 
– the power to charge tax on air passengers leaving Scottish airports should be devolved; 
– the power to tax commercial exploitation of aggregate should be devolved; 
– the receipts raised in Scotland by the first 10 percentage points of the standard rate of Value 
Added Tax (VAT) should be assigned to the Scottish Government’s budget but VAT itself should 
remain reserved; and 
– all other taxes would remain reserved including National Insurance, Inheritance Tax, Capital 
Gains Tax Corporation Tax and taxation of oil and gas receipts. 
5 SCOTLAND BILL 2015–2016 
The Scotland Bill 2015–2016 attempts to implement the Smith Commission’s report. There 
has been considerable acrimonious dispute over whether the Bill fully delivers the additional 
powers promised by the Smith Commission, with not only the SNP14 but also a former 
Labour Prime Minister of the UK complaining that the Bill does not implement the Smith 
Commission in full.15 There is no space to conduct a detailed evaluation of this controversy. 
It seems to me that, whilst there is room to disagree on points of detail, the Bill does broadly 
deliver what was recommended by the Smith Commission and will result in what is by 
international standards a very high degree of sub-state financial and policy-making 
autonomy.16 Whether the Bill’s provisions taken together will resolve the current 
constitutional uncertainty and in what direction is a separate question. 
I will comment briefly on each of the three ‘pillars’ beginning with the proposals on the 
constitutional status of devolved government. 
5.1 CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS 
The vow made by the three party leaders before the referendum included the statement ‘we 
are agreed that the Scottish Parliament is permanent …’ Whilst this was clearly a political 
commitment to maintain the Scottish Parliament, it is unclear whether it was meant to signify 
                                                          
14 See, e.g. ‘Mundell must strengthen Scotland Bill’, available at: http://www.snp.org/media-
centre/news/2015/sep/mundell-must-strengthen-scotland-bill. 
15 See, ‘David Cameron risks “double betrayal” of Scotland, says Gordon Brown’ Guardian online, 08 Oct. 
2015, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/oct/08/david-cameron-risks-double-betrayal-
scotland-gordon-brown. 
16 See, e.g. R. Hazell (ed.), Devolution and the Future of the Union (above). 
a commitment to change the legal status of devolved government. Paragraph 21 of The Smith 
Commission Report said that ‘UK legislation will state that the Scottish Parliament and 
Government are permanent institutions’. This statement is open to a variety of interpretations. 
It could be read as recommending: (a) that legislation would be passed which would make 
the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government permanent institutions as a matter of law, 
i.e., that they were constitutionally entrenched, or (b) as recommending that such a statement 
would be included in an Act of Parliament without any implication as to its legal effects. 
Presumably, this lack of clarity is explained by the need to find a form of words that all five 
political parties could agree to. However, this ambiguity would inevitably make it difficult to 
decide whether any subsequent legislation fulfilled the Commission’s recommendation.17 
Clause 1 of the Scotland Bill as originally introduced stated that ‘A Scottish Parliament is 
recognized as a permanent part of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements.’ It also 
stated that ‘A Scottish Government is recognized as a permanent part of the United 
Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements.’ 
If enacted, this provision will not have the effect of making either the Scottish Parliament 
or the Scottish Government permanent as a matter of law. The first reason for doubting 
whether it has this effect is the peculiar language. The use of the phrase ‘is recognized’ seems 
more appropriate for a statement of fact. It is not clear, therefore, whether a court would treat 
it as a normative statement capable of being given legal effect. The second reason is the 
principle of the sovereignty of Parliament. On the orthodox view of sovereignty, any 
statement that the Scottish Parliament is a permanent institution would not bind a future 
Parliament which could simply repeal it. In the original Bill no attempt was made to entrench 
the provision, e.g., by requiring an enhanced majority in either House as a condition of 
passing a Bill abolishing the SP, or a popular referendum before abolition could be put into 
effect. However, by the time the Bill reached the House of Lords, an amendment had been 
made requiring approval in a popular referendum before the SP could be abolished. It is 
certainly open to question whether a court would give effect to such provisions by holding 
that a Bill purporting to abolish the SP without satisfying these requirements was invalid, but 
the possibility cannot be ruled out in our evolving constitutions. The inclusion of the 
refeerendum requirements does at least indicate that a serious attempt is being made to make 
                                                          
17 For detailed analysis of the Scotland Bill draft clause and discussion of whether it fully implements the Smith 
Commission’s recommendation, see Devolution (Further Powers) Committee, New Powers for Scotland: An 
Interim Report on the Smith Commission and the UK Government’s Proposals, SP Paper 720 3rd Report, 
Session 4 (2015), 14 May 2015, 11–14, available at: 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_ScotlandBillCommittee/Reports/dfpr-15-03w-rev.pdf. 
the SP and the SG permanent features of the constitution. It is also important to note that a 
statutory provision may have political as well as legal effects. It might be argued that the 
enactment of such a provision would have strong symbolic force and would make it 
politically more difficult for a future UK Government to propose, or a future UK Parliament 
to enact, abolition of the SP or SG. In this way, the provision would have real political value. 
A sceptic might doubt whether the provision would actually have this benefit as it would 
merely reinforce what has already become established as a principle underpinning the UK’s 
constitutional order, namely that it is for the Scottish people to determine their form of 
government, including, if they so choose, by leaving the UK. However, if the promise of a 
referendum were not kept that would almost certainly cause political uproar, so it does seem 
as if the revised permanence clause might make some political difference. 
Clause 2 of the Bill as originally introduced states that ‘… it is recognized that the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved 
matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament’.18 This is intended to implement the 
Smith Commission’s recommendation that the Sewel Convention should be put on a statutory 
footing. Again, the intention behind the Commission’s statement was unclear. Did the Smith 
Commission mean that the principle of the convention – that the UK Parliament will not 
normally legislate on devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament – 
should become legally binding or merely that it should be written down in an Act of 
Parliament? The wording of the clause fulfils the second function (i.e., it expresses the 
principle of the convention) up to a point, although it fails to make it clear that the convention 
covers not only UK legislation on devolved matters, but also extends to legislation altering 
the Scottish Parliament‘s legislative competence and the executive competence of Scottish 
Ministers. However, it seems doubtful if it imposes any legally enforceable constraint on the 
powers of the UK Parliament. Section 28(7) of the Scotland states that the UK Parliament 
retains power to legislate for Scotland and the Bill does not seek to amend that provision. It is 
conceivable that the clause is intended to mean that an exercise of legislative power by the 
UK Parliament without the consent of the Scottish Parliament would be open to challenge 
under some circumstances but if that were the intention there are far more obvious ways in 
which to draft a clause, e.g., simply stating ‘the Parliament of the United Kingdom may 
                                                          
18 For detailed analysis of this draft clause and discussion of whether it fully implements the Smith 
Commission’s recommendation, see the Report of the Devolution (Further Powers) Committee above, 15–17. 
 
legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament only 
in exceptional circumstances’. Accordingly, the Bill continues the original fudge. 
Whilst the enactment of provisions with uncertain legal effects (or none) may be irritating 
to constitutional lawyers, it may not have major adverse political consequences. No UK 
government is, in any likely political scenario, going to try to abolish the Scottish Parliament 
against the will of the Scottish people, so if the new permanence clause is not in fact a legally 
enforceable guarantee of devolved government that does not make the continuation of 
devolved government precarious in fact. A different worry might have been that a perceived 
failure to fulfil the promise might cause resentment which could weaken the union, but whilst 
there will be temptation for the SNP to make political capital out of any supposed failure to 
implement the Smith Commission proposals, it is doubtful if the issues raised by these 
clauses will be of great interest to the general public. Their concern is likely to focus more on 
what additional powers are given to the SP and SG. 
5.2 ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONAL COMPETENCE 
Apart from these constitutional provisions, the Bill does two things: confers additional 
functional competences on the Scottish Parliament and Government, and extends their 
financial competence and responsibility. 
Extending functional competence was not a straightforward matter. The original transfer of 
power in 1999 was relatively smooth because of the history of administrative devolution 
which preceded it. The Scottish Office – a territorial department of the UK Government – had 
held responsibility for many of the functions of government in Scotland including education, 
housing, health, agriculture and fisheries, criminal and civil law. In effect, the new Scottish 
Executive (later renamed the Scottish Government) took over the responsibilities of the 
Scottish Office with most civil servants remaining in post. The new Parliament was given 
legislative functions in broadly those areas of policy. So, once the principle of devolution had 
been accepted, there were no major disputes about which powers should be devolved. 
There was no such ready-made principle which could be used to decide the appropriate 
extent of further devolution, nor was there a consensus amongst the political parties as to 
what the powers would be. Nor was this simply a division between the nationalist parties (the 
SNP and the Green party) and the rest. Even the pro-union parties did not agree about the 
desirable extent of devolution. However, whatever powers were conferred, it was necessary 
that they be substantial in order to keep the promise that had been made before the 
referendum. The agreement that Smith Commission eventually reached was a political 
compromise; it was what each political party was prepared to agree to rather than what any of 
them wanted. 
It is useful to compare the Smith proposals with those of the Calman Commission. The 
Calman Commission, appointed by the UK government in response to the SNP becoming the 
largest party in 2007, was essentially a vehicle for the pro-union parties to see off the 
nationalist threat by agreeing what additional powers should be devolved. The Calman 
Commission’s report published in 2009 recommended significant new powers over 
taxation.19 The proposals had been enacted in the Scotland Act 2012, but the most significant 
proposal (greater power to vary income tax) had not yet come into effect by the time of the 
referendum. However, the proposals for extending legislative competence over new functions 
were extremely modest (regulation of airguns, and power to set drink-driving limits and the 
national speed limit). In the political circumstances following the referendum, to repeat such 
a modest approach would not have been possible; the Smith Commission had to offer 
something much more substantial and it has offered greater tax-raising powers (coupled with 
a corresponding reduction in the annual block grant to support public spending). 
Aside from ‘essentially’ centralized functions such as defence and foreign relations, two 
main rationales have been used to justify the reservation of functions to the UK Government; 
the single market rationale and the social solidarity rationale. The single market rationale is 
that the whole of the UK should function as an integrated market for goods and services. That 
in turn requires harmonization of the laws affecting that market as differences on those laws 
might act as an impediment to the integration of the market. That explains the reservation of 
macro-economic policy, the currency and most taxation, employment law, competition law 
and many forms of regulation including the regulation of utilities. The social solidarity 
rationale has been used to justify the reservation of the major public services comprised in the 
modern welfare state including social security benefits and pensions. For the Calman 
Commission, the UK welfare state was a scheme of shared citizenship which presupposed 
social solidarity. It rejected substantial devolution of social security for that reason. In fact, 
two major public services have long been devolved – health and education. The Commission 
did not think that this weakened the social solidarity rationale as the devolution of health and 
education in 1999 reflected the pre-existing administrative devolution of those functions, and 
the basic principles of delivery (free healthcare at the point of need and universal provision of 
school education were uniform across the UK). 
                                                          
19 Serving Scotland Better. Part 3. 
The most significant new powers are those over welfare benefits. If enacted, the Scotland 
Bill will devolve legislative power over housing benefit, benefits for carers, disabled people 
and those who are ill, and power to create new social security benefits within the area of 
devolved responsibility (e.g., new housing-related benefits) and to top-up benefits which 
remain reserved to the UK government (e.g., the SP could increase the rate of jobseekers 
allowance, the principal benefit for the unemployed. 
The proposals for devolution of welfare are potentially problematic. There is the problem 
of maintaining cohesion. Up till now, social security has been treated as a fully integrated 
system, in which each benefit contributes to the goals of the system (e.g., preventing poverty 
and maintaining work incentives). One example of this is ‘passporting’, the process whereby 
qualifying for one benefit leads to qualifying for others. Thus, eligibility for income-based 
jobseekers allowance (an out-of-work benefit) and child tax credit (an in-work benefit) both 
trigger eligibility for maximum housing benefit, i.e., covering the whole eligible rent. 
Administration is also fully integrated with all benefits being administered by the Department 
of Work and Pensions. 
The Administration of benefits will clearly become more complex as a result. More 
importantly, the devolution of welfare benefits may cause problems of policy coherence 
because instead of social security policy being made solely by the UK government, it will in 
future be made by two governments which may pursue conflicting policy objectives. The 
aims of future measures taken by the Scottish government may be undermined by changes 
made to reserved aspects of social security made in pursuant different objectives. Currently, 
the Scottish political parties (other than the Conservative party) profess a different vision for 
social security than the UK Conservative government with the former emphasizing the 
maintaining of living standards and reducing inequality through generous levels of benefit 
whilst the latter emphasizes raising living standards through getting more people into work 
and raising wages, and intends to add a further GBP 12 billion of cuts in social security 
spending to those already made by the coalition government during 2010–2015. Whilst the 
new powers are intended to allow Scotland to take a different approach to social security, it is 
not clear that it will be possible to do so in practice. More fundamentally, if the Calman 
Commission was correct in its analysis that the welfare state is crucial to creating and 
reinforcing a sense of common citizenship, then substantial devolution in this area risks 
weakening the ties of common citizenship. 
In fact, this is the dilemma that at least for supporters of the union underlies this whole 
process. Substantial further devolution appears to be necessary to persuade most Scots that 
they ought to remain within the union, yet it also risks loosening the remaining ties that bind 
the union together. Emotional perceptions of national identity no longer serve to support the 
union; there has been a long-term decline in the proportion of the population professing a 
primarily British or equally British and Scottish identity as opposed to a primarily Scottish 
identity. Interest-based reasons for sticking together – such as the pooling of risks in the 
welfare state – have become more important to preserving the nation, but more devolution 
inevitably reduces the significance of those reasons. Add to that the fact that devolution has 
enhanced the distinctiveness of the Scottish political sphere and that further devolution will 
continue to do so, and the long-term threat to the viability of the UK state is obvious. 
5.3 FINANCING DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT 
There is no doubt that the Bill delivers greater financial autonomy. As a result, future Scottish 
Governments will have both a wider range of substantive policy-making responsibility and 
greater freedom to make taxing and spending decisions. However, these comments refer to 
legal autonomy. Whether the new structure gives Scottish Governments greater practical 
freedom to make policy choices is a separate question. Some policies have only limited 
implications for public expenditure. Both the legislation banning the advertising of tobacco 
products at the point of sale and the sale of tobacco from vending machines and the 
legislation imposing a minimum price for the sale of alcohol were important public health 
measures which required no additional public spending. However, many possible new 
policies would require substantial additional public expenditure which would have to be 
financed by cutting spending on existing programmes or by raising taxes. Both might be 
politically difficult. 
Of course, national governments face exactly this dilemma, but they have more financial 
tools at their disposal. Currently, the UK government can choose from the full range of taxes 
to support public spending and because it also controls social security it can offset any 
adverse effects on tax increases on particular groups by adjusting other taxes and /or 
adjusting benefits. The Scottish Government will have far less flexibility as it will control 
only one major source of revenue tax – income tax (and only part of that tax) and only some 
social security benefits. Therefore, introducing policies, which might in themselves be 
popular (e.g. more generous benefits) might have consequences for the population that were 
themselves very unpopular. Income tax is the most visible tax and it has become increasingly 
hard for political parties to contemplate increasing it. One possible consequence is that a 
future Scottish Government might find it difficult to finance policies which diverge greatly 
from those currently being pursued by the UK government. We might, therefore, find that 
greater legal autonomy does not lead to distinctively Scottish policies. That circumstance 
might lead to cynicism about the value of enhanced devolution which in turn might fuel 
scepticism about the benefits of remaining in the UK 
6 CONCLUSION 
This rapport had provided a brief analysis of the vote at the referendum and an overview of 
the proposals for further devolution which are currently being considered. Whilst the Bill 
may be amended it is very unlikely that any major changes will be made before it is enacted. 
Devolved government in Scotland will, therefore, have the powers set out in the Bill. 
However, if there is certainty about the future legal position, there is considerable uncertainty 
about the political future and whether the new framework for devolved governance and the 
process which is being followed to create it will help to hasten or to prevent the break-up of 
the UK. 
